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The Kyoto Protocol has not only created carbon emission reduction obligations for industrialized 
countries, but also opportunities for the private sector to participate in its "flexible mechanisms". One 
of these mechanisms is Joint Implementation, which allows private legal entities to engage in 
international emission reduction projects that generate tradable emission rights. Private parties can act 
as verifiers of the emission reductions achieved by such projects, or as buyers of the generated 
emission rights (which can be used, e.g., for compliance under the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme). During the Joint Implementation project cycle, these private parties can become involved in 
several types of disputes with various counterparties. This paper explores the legal remedies available 
to such private parties. Long-term private sector investment and contribution to the objectives of the 
Kyoto Protocol are more likely to occur in a stable regulatory environment, which requires a certain 
degree of legal protection. This includes proper access to justice in case disputes arise. 
Keywords 
Carbon, climate change, global warming, Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Copenhagen Accord, EU Emissions Trading Scheme, Directive 2003/87/EC, 
Directive 2004/101/EC, flexible mechanisms, market mechanisms, International Emissions Trading, 
Joint Implementation, Clean Development Mechanism, human rights, access to justice, immunity from 





1 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
2 
has introduced the first-ever global emissions trading scheme. Parties included in Annex I to the 
UNFCCC with greenhouse gas emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B 
to the Kyoto Protocol (Annex I countries) may only emit greenhouse gases into the atmosphere if they 
have sufficient emission rights to "justify" (or set-off) their emissions retroactively.
3 At the end of the 
relevant Kyoto commitment period, each country must retire (surrender) a number of emission rights 
equivalent to the greenhouse gas emissions that have taken place in its territory during that period, to 
demonstrate its compliance with the Kyoto commitments.
4 Annex I countries can achieve their 
commitments not only by taking domestic emission reduction measures, but also by making use of the 
three flexible mechanisms (or "flex mechs") of the Kyoto Protocol: (a) International Emissions 
Trading, (b) the Clean Development Mechanism, and (c) Joint Implementation. 
(a) International Emissions Trading 
There are four types of tradable emission rights under the Kyoto Protocol: Assigned Amount Units 
(AAUs), Removal Units (RMUs), Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction 
Units (ERUs), each representing one metric ton of CO2 equivalent.
5 These emission rights are held in 
electronic registries. The mechanism of International Emissions Trading (IET)
6 governs the 
international transfer of emission rights between Annex I countries, i.e. from an account in the national 
registry of country A to an account in the national registry of country B.
7 Annex I countries may use 
IET to acquire additional emission rights or dispose of excess emission rights.
8 
                                                      
*  Sander Simonetti is a senior associate in the energy and carbon practice group of the international law firm De Brauw 
Blackstone Westbroek. At the time of writing this paper, he was a visiting fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Florence. 
1  Signed on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005 (available at the UNFCCC website, 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html). 
2 Signed in 1992 and entered into force on 21 March 1994 (available at the UNFCCC website, 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf). 
3  Six greenhouse gases fall within the scope of the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
(N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
4  Paragraph 13 of the Modalities for accounting of assigned amounts under Article 7, paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol 
(Decision 13/CMP.1). 
5  The concept of global warming potential has been introduced in order to make the six greenhouse gases of the Kyoto 
Protocol compatible. Each gas has a certain rating based on its power to accelerate global warming. The rating index has 
been provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
6  Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
7  R. de Witt Wijnen and S. Simonetti, "International Emissions Trading and Green Investment Schemes", in: Legal Aspects 
of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and beyond, ed. D. Freestone and C. Streck, Oxford 2009, p. 157 ff. 
8  The Kyoto Protocol has introduced a cap-and-trade scheme. At the beginning of the relevant commitment period, each 
Annex I country is allocated an emissions cap (Assigned Amount) in the form of a limited amount of AAUs. The 
greenhouse gas emissions in such country’s territory during the commitment period may not exceed its Assigned 
Amount, unless additional emission rights (AAUs, RMUs, CERs or ERUs) have been acquired through the use of the 
flexible mechanisms. Countries that emit less than their cap may sell their surplus emission rights and countries whose 
emissions exceed their cap must buy additional emission rights. Sander Simonetti 
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(b) The Clean Development Mechanism 
CDM is a baseline-and-credit mechanism, which allows Annex I countries to earn emission rights by 
participating in emission reduction projects in "developing countries", i.e. non-Annex I countries 
(which do not have greenhouse gas emission limitation and reduction commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol themselves).
9 The emission rights generated by CDM projects are called CERs. At the start of 
the relevant CDM project, a baseline is established by calculating the amount of emissions that would 
occur in the absence of the project (the business-as-usual scenario). The difference between this 
baseline and the actual (lower) emissions as a result of the project is converted into CERs. The CDM 
project cycle is supervised and administered by special UNFCCC bodies, the CDM Executive Board 
and the UNFCCC Secretariat. 
(c) Joint Implementation 
The mechanism of JI
10 is a baseline-and-credit system similar to CDM. However, whereas CDM 
projects take place in non-Annex I countries, JI projects must be developed in Annex I countries. JI 
therefore allows an Annex I country to earn emission rights by participating in emission reduction 
projects in another Annex I country. The emission rights generated by JI projects are called ERUs.
11 
Although the Kyoto Protocol is a treaty between sovereign states, it also creates an opportunity for 
private parties to play a role in emission reduction projects and carbon emissions trading. The idea is 
that market mechanisms, and private sector investment and innovation, can help achieve the global 
emission reduction goals and pave the way to a low-carbon economy in both developed and 
developing countries.
12 Annex I countries may therefore authorise private parties (legal entities) to 
participate in the flex mechs, i.e. allow them to trade emission rights under IET and engage in CDM 
and JI projects to earn CERs and ERUs, respectively. Private parties may use these emission rights 
either for trading purposes (e.g., sell them to an Annex I country that needs additional emission rights 
for its compliance under the Kyoto Protocol) or for their own compliance under national or regional 
emission trading schemes, such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).
13 In 
addition, private parties can also act as verifiers of emission reduction projects under CDM and JI. 
When participating in the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, and especially in CDM and 
JI projects, private parties can encounter various types of disputes. Such disputes may involve 
countries (Parties to the Kyoto Protocol), or other private parties. In addition, private parties in CDM 
and JI are faced with certain special UNFCCC bodies. Under the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC 
legal framework, these bodies have the authority to take decisions that directly affect the rights and 
                                                      
9  Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol; further elaborated in the Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism 
(Decision 3/CMP.1). 
10  Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
11  Unlike CDM, where the generated CERs are newly created emission rights, JI uses the Annex I country's AAUs as 
underlying currency. When issuing ERUs, the host country of the JI project actually converts a portion of its AAUs into 
ERUs. Therefore, JI projects usually (but not necessarily) take place in countries with surplus AAUs. These are mostly 
countries with economies in transition (in Central and Eastern Europe). As AAUs are allocated to countries on the basis 
of historic emissions in a baseline year (which is 1990 for most countries) and these countries' industries have changed 
dramatically since, they now have large numbers of surplus AAUs (which are not needed to set-off their own emissions). 
12  K. Kulovesi, "The Private Sector and the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Experiences, Challenges and Prospects", 
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 2007, 16(2), p. 146. 
13  The EU ETS basically mirrors the state-level Kyoto cap-and-trade system to the industry. Pursuant to the EU ETS 
Directive (2003/87/EC), individual greenhouse gas emitting installations are allocated an emissions cap and must 
surrender emission rights to justify their emissions. Operators that emit less than their cap may sell their allocated 
emission rights to operators with excess emissions. In addition, the Linking Directive (2004/101/EC) connects the EU 
ETS to the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol by providing that member states may also allow operators to use 
CERs and ERUs for compliance under the EU ETS (up to a certain maximum percentage). Access to Justice for the Private Sector in Joint Implementation Projects under the Kyoto Protocol 
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obligations of the participating private parties. However, when a private party disagrees with their 
decisions, the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC do not seem to provide such party with adequate 
remedies. This would be contrary to the principle of access to justice, which is a fundamental right of 
private parties.
14 
The legal protection of private parties participating in Kyoto projects has attracted considerable 
attention in the context of CDM.
15 However, to date there has not been much attention for the 
remedies of private parties active in JI.
16 This may be due to the fact that, compared to CDM, JI 
projects are relatively recent.
17 However, although the volume of JI projects is overall smaller than that 
of CDM, there is a serious market for ERUs and numerous private parties are currently active in JI.
18 
This justifies a closer look at their legal protection.  
This paper will explore the possible disputes that private parties engaging in JI may become 
involved in and assess the remedies available to such private parties. But first, the main characteristics 
of the JI framework and project cycle are set out. 
2. Joint Implementation 
Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol provides that Annex I countries can engage in activities to reduce 
emissions jointly, by transferring or acquiring ERUs from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic 
emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases. The rules 
for JI have been further elaborated in guidelines. 
2.1 JI Regulatory Framework 
At the seventh Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC in Marrakesh in 2001, the draft 
guidelines for JI were adopted, along with those for CDM and IET. These are generally referred to as 
the Marrakesh Accords.
19 After entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, further decisions were taken at 
the first COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) in Montreal.
20 The 
CMP adopted the JI Guidelines
21, confirming and giving effect to actions taken pursuant to the draft JI 
guidelines, as well as further procedures for implementing JI and establishing the Joint 
Implementation Supervisory Committee, thereby setting out modalities for its role in verification of 
                                                      
14 See,  e.g., Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
15 See,  inter alia, P.R. Kalas and A Herwig, "Dispute Resolution under the Kyoto Protocol", Ecology Law Quarterly, (2000) 
27, p. 119 ff; C. Streck and J. Lin, "Making Markets work: A Review of CDM Performance and the Need for Reform", 
European Journal of International Law, 2008, 19(2), p. 436; E.E. Meijer, "The International Institutions of the Clean 
Development Mechanisms Brought before National Courts: Limiting Jurisdictional Immunity to Achieve Access to 
Justice", New York University School of Law Journal on International Law and Politics, 2007, 39(4),, p. 873-928; and P. 
Nedergaard and H.J. Stehr (Copenhagen Business School), A comparative analysis of the Clean Development Mechanism 
and other mechanisms comparable in terms of main objectives functions, report to the International Emissions Trading 
Association (IETA) dated 29 April 2008, paragraph 8.3. 
16  Cf. D. Ratliff, "Arbitration in Flexible-Mechanism Contracts", in: Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol 
Mechanisms: Making Kyoto Work, ed. Freestone and Streck, Oxford 2005, p. 384. 
17  CDM had a "jump start" as it was provided in Article 12(10) of the Kyoto Protocol that CERs obtained during the period 
from the year 2000 can be used for compliance. ERUs, however, can only be issued for a crediting period starting after 
the beginning of the year 2008 (Decision 9/CMP.1, paragraph 5). 
18 See  http://ji.unfccc.int/JI_Projects/ProjectInfo.html. 
19 FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.  2 Decision 16/CP.7. 
20  FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add. 2 (30 March 2006). 
21  Decision 9/CMP.1, paragraph 2, and the Annex to Decision 9/CMP.1 (the JI Guidelines). Sander Simonetti 
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emissions reductions and its first programme of work.
22 At its first meeting, the JISC adopted draft 
rules of procedure.
  23 These were provisionally applied until the JISC Rules of Procedure were 
formally adopted by the CMP at its second session.
24 The full text of all decisions of the JISC is made 
publicly available
25 on the JI website of the UNFCCC.
26 The JISC is supported by the UNFCCC 
Secretariat.
27 
Private Party Participation 
As in the other flexible mechanisms, IET and CDM, private parties may participate in JI.
28 Paragraph 
3 of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol provides that a Party included in Annex I may authorise legal 
entities to participate, under its responsibility, in actions leading to the generation, transfer or 
acquisition of ERUs.
29 Such authorisation is given by means of a Letter of Approval (LoA). Private 
parties wishing to participate in a JI project therefore have to apply for an LoA under applicable 
national rules and procedures of the relevant Annex I country.
30 This applies to both the project 
developer (the seller of the ERUs) and the first recipient of the ERUs (the buyer).
31 If the project 
developer is a private party, it has to obtain an LoA from the host country of the JI project. And if the 
recipient of the ERUs is a private party, it has to obtain an LoA from another Annex I country (where 
it wishes to receive the ERUs). The JI Guidelines make no distinction as to the country of 
incorporation or domicile of the legal entity. Therefore, an Annex I country may also authorise a 
private party not incorporated or having its domicile in such country's jurisdiction. An Annex I country 
that authorises legal entities to participate in JI projects remains responsible for the fulfillment of its 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and must ensure that such participation is consistent with the JI 
Guidelines.
32 
2.2 A Two-Track Mechanism 
Pursuant to the JI Guidelines, there are two "tracks" for generating ERUs, which differ in their 
respective procedures for the verification of the greenhouse gas emission reductions generated by the 
relevant JI project. Under Track 1, project monitoring and verification take place under the 
                                                      
22  Decision 10/CMP.1.  
23  JISC 1 (2-3 February 2006), Rules of procedure of the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee (available from 
http://ji.unfccc.int/Ref/Documents/Rules.pdf).  
24 Decision  9/CMP.1. 
25  Pursuant to paragraph 16 of the JI Guidelines. 
26 At  http://ji.unfccc.int/Sup_Committee/Meetings/index.html. 
27  Paragraph 19 of the JI Guidelines. 
28  For CDM, this is provided in Article 12(9) of the Kyoto Protocol. Private party participation in IET is provided for in the 
IET Modalities (Decision 11/CMP.1). 
29  See also paragraph 3 of the Modalities of communications of project participants with the Joint Implementation 
Supervisory Committee (Annex 4 to JISC 8), which provides that a project participant may be either a Party involved in 
the JI project or a legal entity authorised by a Party involved to participate in the JI project. 
30  Actually, the country's LoA contains both its approval (i.e. confirmation that the country's participation in the relevant JI 
project is voluntary) and its authorisation (i.e. consent to the participation of the private entity in such project). Cf. R. de 
Witt Wijnen, "A Better Letter", Point Carbon CDM Monitor, March 2008, p. 36. 
31  Once the ERUs have been issued and transferred to the first recipient (i.e. to an account in the national registry of an 
Annex I country other than the host country), they can subsequently be traded on the secondary market. If such secondary 
trades lead to international transfers of ERUs, these are effected under the mechanism of IET (Article 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol) and therefore do not require an LoA in respect of the JI project from which they originate.  
32  Paragraph 29 of the JI Guidelines. This paragraph also provides that legal entities may only transfer or acquire ERUs if 
the authorising Party is eligible to do so at that time. Access to Justice for the Private Sector in Joint Implementation Projects under the Kyoto Protocol 
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responsibility of the host country, whereas under Track 2, verification is carried out by a professional 
independent third-party verifier, hired by the project participants and supervised by a special UN body, 
the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee (JISC). Track 1 is also known as the "fast track", 
because standards are more flexible, external third-party determination is not required and baseline 
and monitoring procedures are set by the host country.
33 However, the eligibility threshold for 
countries is higher in Track 1 than in Track 2. 
Eligibility 
Paragraph 21 of the JI Guidelines provides that an Annex I country is eligible to transfer and/or 
acquire ERUs issued in accordance with the relevant provisions, if it is in compliance with the 
following eligibility requirements:  
(a)  it is a Party to the Kyoto Protocol; 
(b)  its Assigned Amount
34 has been calculated and recorded
35; 
(c)  it has a national system in place
36 for estimating anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
anthropogenic removals of greenhouse gases by sinks; 
(d)  it has a national registry in place
37; 
(e)  it has annually submitted its most recent required inventory
38; and 
(f)  it has accurate procedures in place for accounting of its Assigned Amount and submission of 
information.
39 
The assessment and monitoring of the eligibility requirements is assigned to the enforcement branch of 
the Compliance Committee of the UNFCCC.
40 If a host country is considered to fulfill all of the 
eligibility requirements, the JI Track 1 procedure may be applied. Where a host country does not meet 
all of the eligibility requirements, Track 2 may be applied. However, the host country may only issue 
and transfer ERUs upon meeting at least the requirements mentioned in paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) 
above.
41 The UNFCCC Secretariat maintains a publicly accessible list
42 of Parties that meet the 
eligibility requirements and Parties whose eligibility has been suspended.
43 The eligibility status of 
Parties is regularly updated. 
                                                      
33  Ratliff, n. 16 above, p. 57, paragraph 1.2. 
34  Pursuant to Article 3(7) and (8) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
35  In accordance with Decision 13/CMP.1. 
36  In accordance with Article 5(1) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
37  In accordance with Article 7(4) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
38  In accordance with Article 5(2) and Article 7(1) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
39  The Party should submit supplementary information on its Assigned Amount in accordance with Article 7(1) of the 
Kyoto Protocol and make any additions to, and subtractions from, its Assigned Amount pursuant to Article 3(7) and (8), 
of the Kyoto Protocol, including for the activities under Article 3(3) and (4) of the Kyoto Protocol, in accordance with 
Article 7(4) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
40  Paragraph 4(c) of the Procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol (Decision 27/CMP.1). 
41  Paragraph 24 of the JI Guidelines. 
42 Pursuant to paragraph 27 of the JI Guidelines. This list is available on the UNFCCC website (see 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/enforcement_branch/items/3785.php). As of 1 November 2009, the only 
Annex I country that is not eligible is Croatia (eligibility expected on 27 December 2009). 
43  A Party may be suspended in accordance with relevant provisions contained in Decision 27/CMP.1. Sander Simonetti 
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To participate in JI, a country must inform the UNFCCC Secretariat of its national guidelines and 
procedures for approving JI projects and of its Designated Focal Point (DFP)
44,  i.e. the office, 




Under Track 1, the host country may verify emission reductions itself
46, i.e. verification can be carried 
out by a public or private entity under the host country's national JI rules.
47 Upon such verification, the 
host country may issue the appropriate quantity of ERUs.
48  
Even if the host country meets all requirements for Track 1, it may still elect to use the verification 
procedure under Track 2.
49 For (private) project participants, Track 2 may be more attractive because 
the risk to the host country is lower. Furthermore, host countries that might qualify for Track 1 may 
still prefer to try to attract Track 2 projects and not incur the costs of implementing measures for 
meeting Track 1 eligibility, as they may expect that the number of Track 1 projects they would be 
hosting will be relatively small.
50 
Figure I: Eligibility Requirements for JI Track 1 and Track 2 
 
 
                                                      
44  Similar to the country's Designated National Authority (DNA) for CDM projects. 
45  Paragraph 20 of the JI Guidelines. 
46  Paragraph 23 of the JI Guidelines. The UNFCCC JI website contains an overview of both Track 1 and JI Track 2 
projects. 
47  Of course, such national JI rules may provide that verification must be carried out by a third-party verifier (like in Track 
2). However, this is not required under the JI Guidelines. 
48  In accordance with the relevant provisions of decision 13/CMP.1 (Modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts 
under Article 7, paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol). 
49  Paragraph 25 of the JI Guidelines. 
50  Ratliff, n. 16 above, p. 58. Access to Justice for the Private Sector in Joint Implementation Projects under the Kyoto Protocol 
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Track 2 
Under Track 2, project determination and verification of emission reductions is carried out by an 
independent entity under supervision of the JISC. After verification, the host country
51 may issue and 
transfer the resulting ERUs.
52 
Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee 
The main functions of the JISC are (1) accrediting independent entities, and (2) supervising the 
determination of projects and verification of ERUs by these Accredited Independent Entities (AIEs).
53 
The JISC can draw on external expertise to properly operate its functions mandated by the CMP, at 
least with regard to accreditation and project baseline and monitoring issues.
54 For the former, the 
JISC has established the JI Accreditation Panel, while for the latter, a roster of experts is available 
from which the JISC can select experts, in particular for the appraisal/review process. The JI 
Accreditation Panel supports the JISC in accrediting independent entities by providing input and 
recommendations to the JISC as this task requires experience in accreditation and case-by-case in-
depth assessment. The JI Accreditation Panel establishes a Joint Implementation Assessment Team on 
a case-by-case basis, by drawing members from the roster of experts. 
As to the composition of the JISC, the JI Guidelines provide that the JISC must comprise ten 
members from Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, including: (a) three members from Annex I countries that 
are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy; (b) three members from other Annex I 
countries; (c) three members from non-Annex I countries; and (d) one member from the small island 
developing states.
55 
Members of the JISC serve in their personal capacities and must have recognised competence 
relating to climate change issues and in relevant technical and policy fields.
56 The JISC members are 
not allowed to have a pecuniary or financial interest in any aspect of a JI project
57 and have a 
confidentiality obligation.
58 They are bound by the JISC Rules of Procedure
59 and must take a written 
oath of service witnessed by the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC.
60 
Accreditation of Independent Entities 
Pursuant to the standards and procedures for accrediting independent entities contained in the Annex 
to the JI Guidelines
61, an independent entity must: 
                                                      
51  Subject to its meeting the requirements under (a), (b) and (d). 
52  Pursuant to paragraph 41 of the JI Guidelines, any provisions relating to the commitment period reserve or other 
limitations to transfers of emission rights under Article 17 Kyoto Protocol do not apply to transfers by a country of ERUs 
issued into its national registry that were verified in accordance with the Track 2 verification procedure under the JISC. 
53  Paragraph 3 of the JI Guidelines. 
54  JISC Fourth Meeting Report, Annex 17 (Joint Implementation Management Plan), Chapter V. 
55  Paragraph 4 of the JI Guidelines. See also Rule 3 of the JISC Rules of Procedure. The CMP will elect five members and 
five alternate members for a term of two years and five members and five alternate members for a term of three years. 
Thereafter, the CMP shall elect, every year, five new members and five alternate members for a term of two years. 
Members of the JISC may be eligible to serve a maximum of two consecutive terms. Terms as alternate members do not 
count. See Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the JI Guidelines and Rule 4 of the JISC Rules of Procedure. 
56  Paragraph 10(a) of the JI Guidelines. See also Rule 4(3) of the JISC Rules of Procedure. 
57  Paragraph 10(b) of the JI Guidelines. See also Rule 9(1) of the JISC Rules of Procedure. 
58  Paragraph 10(c) of the JI Guidelines. See also Rule 11(1) of the JISC Rules of Procedure. 
59  Paragraph 10(a) of the JI Guidelines. See also Rule 4(3) of the JISC Rules of Procedure. 
60  Paragraph 10(d) of the JI Guidelines. See also Rule 4(3) of the JISC Rules of Procedure. 
61  Further elaborated by the JISC in the Procedure for accrediting independent entities (latest version: Annex 1 to JISC 9). Sander Simonetti 
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(a)  be a legal entity (either a domestic legal entity or an international organisation); 
(b)  employ a sufficient number of persons having the necessary competence to perform all 
necessary functions relevant to the verification of ERUs; 
(c)  have the financial stability, insurance coverage and resources required for its activities; 
(d)  have sufficient arrangements to cover legal and financial liabilities arising from its activities; 
(e)  have documented internal procedures for carrying out its functions including, inter alia, 
procedures for the allocation of responsibilities within the organisation and for handling 
complaints (which procedures must be made publicly available); 
(f)  have the necessary expertise to carry out the functions specified in the relevant CMP 
Decisions
62; 
(g) have a management structure that has overall responsibility for performance and 
implementation of the entity’s functions, including quality assurance procedures, and all 
relevant decisions relating to verification
63; and 
(h)  not have pending any judicial process for malpractice, fraud and/or other activity incompatible 
with its functions as an accredited independent entity.
64 
Furthermore, an applicant independent entity must meet the following operational requirements
65: 
(a)  work in a credible, independent, non-discriminatory and transparent manner, complying with 
applicable national law and meeting, in particular, certain requirements in respect of 
impartiality and prevention of conflict of interest; and 
(b)  have adequate arrangements to safeguard confidentiality of the information obtained from JI 
project participants. 
These accreditation requirements have been further elaborated by the JISC in the JI Accreditation 
Procedure.
66 The JISC accredits independent entities in accordance with these standards and 
procedures. Its JI Accreditation Panel is responsible for preparing a recommendation to the JISC 
regarding the accreditation of an applicant independent entity based on the assessment work conducted 
by a JI Assessment Team.  
                                                      
62  In particular, have sufficient knowledge and understanding of: (i) the JI Guidelines, and relevant Decisions of the CMP 
and of the JISC; (ii) environmental issues relevant to the verification of JI projects; (iii) the technical aspects of JI 
activities relevant to environmental issues, including expertise in the setting of baselines and monitoring of emissions and 
other environmental impacts; (iv) relevant environmental auditing requirements and methodologies; (v) methodologies 
for the accounting of anthropogenic emissions by sources and/or anthropogenic removals by sinks (see Annex A to the JI 
Guidelines). 
63  The applicant independent entity must make available: (i) the names, qualifications, experience and terms of reference of 
the senior executive, board members, senior officers and other relevant personnel; (ii) an organisation chart showing lines 
of authority, responsibility and allocation of functions stemming from the senior executive; (iii) its quality assurance 
policy and procedures; (iv) administrative procedures, including document control; (v) its policy and procedures for the 
recruitment and training of independent entity personnel, for ensuring their competence for all necessary functions and 
for monitoring their performance; and (vi) Its procedures for handling complaints, appeals and disputes. 
64  Paragraph 1 of Appendix A to the JI Guidelines. 
65  Paragraph 2 of Appendix A to the JI Guidelines. 
66  Latest version: Annex 1 to JISC 17. Access to Justice for the Private Sector in Joint Implementation Projects under the Kyoto Protocol 
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Figure II: JI Governance Structure 
 
The CMP has decided that the third-party verifiers that are authorised to verify CDM projects (Designated 
Operational Entities or DOEs) may also act provisionally as AIEs under JI, until the JISC has approved its 
procedures for accreditation.
67 Four applicant independent entities have received an "indicative letter" by the JI 
Accreditation Panel
68 and 17 applicant independent entities are "listed for input".
69 
The JISC may suspend or withdraw the accreditation of an independent entity if it has carried out a 
review and found that the entity no longer meets the accreditation standards.
70 So-called “spot checks” 
(i.e. unscheduled surveillance) of AIEs may be carried out at any time.
71 The consideration by the 
JISC to conduct a spot check may be triggered, for example, by complaints regarding the alleged 
failure of the AIE to comply with the requirements of its accreditation by another AIE, an NGO 
accredited with the UNFCCC, or a stakeholder.
72 
Suspension or withdrawal of accreditation may only take place after the independent entity has had 
the opportunity of a hearing and, depending on the outcome of that hearing
73, the JISC's decision to 
suspend or withdraw the accreditation has immediate effect. The decision must be notified to the 
independent entity in writing and also made public. 
                                                      
67  Paragraph 3 of Decision 10/CMP.1 and JISC 7. The determinations and relevant activities undertaken by these entities 
shall be valid only after their accreditation by the JISC is finalised. 
68  In accordance with paragraph 4(b) of the JI Accreditation Procedure, the JI Accreditation Panel issues an "indicative 
letter" to an applicant independent entity once its desk review and on-site assessment have been successfully completed. 
69  In accordance with paragraph 28 of the JI Accreditation Procedure, the JISC publishes the name of the applicant 
independent entities on the UNFCCC JI website and provides the opportunity to Parties, UNFCCC accredited NGOs and 
stakeholders to provide comments or information input on the applicants. 
70  Paragraph 42 of the JI Guidelines. The JI Accreditation Panel is responsible for preparing recommendations regarding 
unscheduled surveillance, suspension and withdrawal of accreditation, re-accreditation and accreditation for additional 
sectoral scope(s). A JI Assessment Team, under the guidance of the JI Accreditation Panel, undertakes the detailed 
assessment of an applicant independent entity and/or AIE, identifies non-conformities, verifies the corrective actions 
implemented by the applicant independent entity or AIE and reports to the JI Accreditation Panel. 
71  Paragraph 5(b) of the JI Accreditation Procedure. 
72  Paragraph 109 of the JI Accreditation Procedure. A "stakeholder" means any member of the public, including individuals, 
groups or communities affected, or likely to be affected, by the project (paragraph 1 (e) of the JI Guidelines). 
73  Paragraph 42 of the JI Guidelines. Sander Simonetti 
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3. The JI Project Cycle under Track 2 
The Track 2 verification procedure is the determination by an AIE of whether a project and the 
ensuing reductions of anthropogenic emissions or the enhancements of anthropogenic removals by 
sinks meet the relevant requirements of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol and the JI Guidelines.
74 In the 
Track 2 project cycle, three phases can be discerned: (1) project development, (2) project 
implementation, and (3) issuance and transfer of ERUs.
 75 
3.1 Project Development 
This phase consists of the preparation and publication of the project design document (PDD), the 
preparation and publication of the determination by the AIE and a possible review by the JISC. 
Project Design Document 
Pursuant to the JI Guidelines
76, project participants are required to submit a PDD to an AIE. The PDD 
should contain all information needed for the determination of whether the project: 
(a)  has been approved by the countries involved (Parties to the Kyoto Protocol); 
(b)  would result in a reduction of anthropogenic emissions by sources or an enhancement of 
anthropogenic removals by sinks that is additional to any that would otherwise occur; and 
(c)  has an appropriate baseline and monitoring plan. 
Appendix B to the JI Guidelines lists certain criteria for baseline setting and monitoring.
77 The 
baseline is the business-as-usual scenario that describes the situation that would occur in the absence 
of the proposed JI project, on the basis of which the "additionality" of the project can be assessed (i.e. 
whether the project fulfils requirement (b) above) and the actual emission reductions can be 
calculated. Methodologies for CDM baselines and monitoring that are approved by the CDM 
Executive Board may also be applied by project participants under JI.
78 
                                                      
74  Paragraph 30 of the JI Guidelines. 
75  In practice, the JI Track 2 project cycle is actually quite similar to CDM. However, some important differences exist, 
which sometimes confuse market parties who are experienced in CDM and wish to engage in JI project activities. This 
may be due to unfamiliarity with the JI-specific jargon. The following table of vocabulary may be instructive (source: V. 
Luján Gallegos and S. Simonetti, JI vs CDM, presentation at IETA Comparative Study Side Event, Carbon Exo Cologne 
2008): 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM):  Joint Implementation (JI) Track 2: 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)  Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) 
CDM Executive Board (CDM EB)  JI Supervisory Committee (JISC) 
Registration Determination 
Verification – Certification  Determination (Verification) 
Designated Operational Entity  Accredited Independent Entity 
Designated National Authority  Designated Focal Point 
 
76 Paragraph  31. 
77  These are further elaborated in the Guidance on criteria for baseline setting and monitoring (Annex 6 to JISC 4). 
78  Paragraph 4(a) of Decision 10/CMP.1. Methodologies approved by the CDM Executive Board are listed in section 
"Methodologies" of the UNFCCC CDM website (http://cdm.unfccc.int). Access to Justice for the Private Sector in Joint Implementation Projects under the Kyoto Protocol 
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The PDD is made publicly available through the UNFCCC Secretariat
79 by publication on the 
UNFCCC JI website.
80 Parties, stakeholders and UNFCCC accredited observers are allowed to 
comment on the PDD for 30 days from the date the PDD is made publicly available.  
Project Determination 
The AIE carries out its project determination on the basis of the PDD. In addition to the above-
mentioned requirements (a)-(c) from the PDD, the AIE is to also assess whether the project 
participants have submitted sufficient documentation on the analysis of the environmental impacts of 
the project activity.
81 
The determination report of the AIE is made publicly available on the UNFCCC JI website
82, 
together with an explanation of its reasons, including a summary of any comments received during the 
public consultation period and a report of how due account was taken of these.
83 
The AIE's determination of the project becomes final 45 days after the date on which the 
determination is made public, unless a country involved in the JI project (Party to the Kyoto Protocol) 
or three members of the JISC request a review of the determination by the JISC.  
Review 
The JISC Review Procedures
84 provide that if a review has been requested
85, the JISC must consider 
such request at its next meeting.
86 At this meeting the JISC may decide
87 (a) to accept the 
determination without conditions, (b) to accept the determination subject to certain conditions
88, or (c) 
that a more detailed review is required. In the last case, the JISC is to decide on the scope of the 
review based on the considerations in the request(s) for review, and determine the composition of a 
                                                      
79  Paragraph 32 of the JI Guidelines. According to the Clarification regarding scopes and steps of witnessing activities 
under the joint implementation accreditation procedure (Annex 5 to JISC 6), also an applicant independent entity can 
make a PDD publicly available through the Secretariat, but only after the JI Assessment Team has accepted the project as 
a witnessing activity. The corresponding determination can be made publicly available through the UNFCCC Secretariat 
in accordance with paragraph 34 of the JI Guidelines only after the independent entity has been accredited for the 
relevant sectoral scope(s) and function. 
80  See also Annex 6 to JISC 8 (Clarification regarding the public availability of documents under the verification procedure 
under the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee). 
81  Including trans-boundary impacts, in accordance with procedures as determined by the host country and, if those impacts 
are considered significant by the project participants or the host country, have undertaken an environmental impact 
assessment in accordance with procedures as required by the host country. See Paragraph 33 of the JI Guidelines. 
82  The JISC has developed a Joint Implementation Determination Report Form (Annex 11 to JISC 4) which AIEs should 
use to file their determination with the UNFCCC Secretariat. 
83  Paragraph 34 of the JI Guidelines. 
84  Procedures for reviews under the verification procedure under the JISC (Annex 1 to JISC 10). Pursuant to paragraph 
11(e) of these JISC Review Procedures, the proposed project is then marked as being “under review” on the UNFCCC JI 
website and a notification is sent through the UNFCCC JI news facility. 
85  Paragraph 35 of the JI Guidelines. The JISC has developed a Determination Review Form which Parties and/or JISC 
members can complete and submit (Appendix 1 to the JISC Review Procedures). 
86  Paragraph 12 of the JISC Review Procedures. 
87  Pursuant to paragraph 13 of the JISC Review Procedures. 
88  In which case (i) the JISC may request the AIE and the project participants to make corrections based on its findings from 
the consideration of the request(s) for review, and (ii) the revised documentation will be checked by the UNFCCC 
Secretariat, in consultation with the Chair of the JISC, if needed, before the determination is finally accepted. Sander Simonetti 
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review team. The review team consists of two JISC members, who will be responsible for supervising 
the review, and outside experts, as appropriate.
89 
The decision by the JISC on the scope of the review and the composition of the review team must 
be made publicly available as part of the report of its meeting.
90 The project participants and the AIE 
that performed the determination must be notified of the decision by the JISC.
91 The review team may 
requests clarification and further information, from the project participants and the AIE.
92 The two 
JISC members supervising the review are responsible for preparing the final recommendation to the 
JISC.
93 
The review is to be finalised as soon as possible, but in any case within six months or at the second 
meeting following the request for review.
94 Taking into consideration recommendations by the two 
JISC members responsible for the review, the JISC may decide to (a) accept the determination without 
conditions, (b) accept the determination subject to certain conditions, or (c) reject the determination.
 95 
The JISC decision on the review is final.
96 It is communicated to the relevant project participants, 
the AIE that performed the determination and published.
97 If the review indicates any issues relating to 
the performance of the AIE, the JISC may consider whether to trigger a spot check of the AIE, in 
accordance with the procedures for accrediting independent entities.
98 If the JISC decides to reject the 
determination and if the AIE is found to be in a situation of malfeasance or incompetence, the AIE is 
to reimburse the costs of the review.
99 
3.2 Project Implementation 
This phase consists of the preparation and publication of the monitoring report by the project 
participants, the preparation and publication of the determination by the AIE and a possible review by 
the JISC. 
Monitoring Report 
Project participants submit a report to the AIE in accordance with the monitoring plan (as included in 
the PDD) on the emission reductions or removals that have been generated by the project.
100 The 
report is made publicly available by the AIE through the UNFCCC Secretariat.
101 
                                                      
89  One JISC member/alternate member of the review team shall be identified as lead member of the team and will be 
responsible for, inter alia, drafting the final recommendation of the team to the JISC, and ensuring that any diverging 
views within the team are reflected. The review team, under the guidance of the JISC members, including alternate 
members, responsible for supervising the review, must provide input, prepare requests for clarification and/or further 
information to the AIE and/or project participants, and analyse information received during the review. 
90  Paragraph 14 of the JISC Review Procedures. 
91  Paragraph 15 of the JISC Review Procedures. 
92  Paragraphs 16-18 of the JISC Review Procedures. 
93  Paragraph 19 of the JISC Review Procedures. 
94  Paragraph 35 of the JI Guidelines and paragraph 20 of the JISC Review Procedures. 
95  Paragraph 21 of the JISC Review Procedures. 
96  Paragraph 35, last sentence, of the JI Guidelines, and paragraph 22 of the JISC Review Procedures. 
97  Paragraph 23 of the JISC Review Procedures. 
98  Paragraph 24 of the JISC Review Procedures. 
99  Paragraph 25 of the JISC Review Procedures (which also states that this provision is "subject to review as experience 
accrues"). 
100 Paragraph 36 of the JI Guidelines. Access to Justice for the Private Sector in Joint Implementation Projects under the Kyoto Protocol 
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Determination 
Upon receipt of the monitoring report, the AIE makes a determination of the emission reductions or 
removals reported by the project participants, provided that they were monitored and calculated in 
accordance with the baseline and monitoring plan from the PDD.
102 The AIE makes its determination 
publicly available through the UNFCCC Secretariat, together with an explanation of its reasons.
103 
The determination is deemed final 15 days after the date on which it is made public, unless a 
country involved in the project (Party to the Kyoto Protocol)
104 or three members of the JISC request a 
review by the JISC.
105  
Review 
If a review has been requested, the JISC will consider the request at its next meeting and decide on 
whether the request for review has merit.
106 If the JISC decides that the request for review does not 
have merit, it may decide
107 to (a) accept the determination without conditions, or (b) accept the 
determination subject to certain conditions
108. 
If the JISC decides that the request for review has merit, it will also decide on details of the review, 
including: (a) the scope of the review based on the considerations in the request(s) for review, and (b) 
the composition of a review team.
109 The review team consists of two JISC members, who will be 
responsible for supervising the review, and outside experts, as appropriate.
110 
The decision by the JISC that a request for review has merit (including the scope of the review and 
the composition of the review team) must be made publicly available.
111 The project participants and 
the AIE that performed the determination must also be notified of the decision.
112 Further clarification 
(Contd.)                                                                   
101 Pursuant to Annex 1 to JISC 14 (Clarification regarding scopes and steps of witnessing activities under the JI 
accreditation procedure), also an applicant independent entity can make a monitoring report publicly available through 
the UNFCCC Secretariat, but only after the JI Assessment Team has accepted the project as a witnessing activity. The 
corresponding verification (determination) can be made publicly available through the Secretariat in accordance with 
paragraph 38 of the JI Guidelines only after the independent entity has been accredited for the relevant sectoral scope(s) 
and function. 
102 Paragraph 37 of the JI Guidelines. 
103 Paragraph 38 of the JI Guidelines. 
104 Through its DFP (paragraph 27 of the JISC Review Procedures). 
105 Paragraph 39 of the JI Guidelines. The JISC has developed a Verification Review Form which Parties and/or JISC 
members can complete and submit (Appendix 2 to the JISC Review Procedures). 
106 Paragraph 33(a) of the JISC Review Procedures. The JISC shall notify the project participants and the AIE that 
performed the determination that a review has been requested, the project shall be marked “review requested” on the 
UNFCCC JI website and a notification shall be sent through the UNFCCC JI news facility (paragraph 32 of the JI 
Guidelines). 
107 Pursuant to paragraph 34 of the JI Review Procedures. 
108 In which case (i) the JISC may request the AIE and the project participants to make corrections based on its findings from 
the consideration of the request(s) for review, and (ii) the revised documentation will be checked by the Secretariat, in 
consultation with the Chair of the JISC, if needed, before the determination is finally accepted. 
109 Paragraph 35 of the JI Review Procedures. 
110 One JISC member of the review team must be identified as lead member of the team and will be responsible for, inter 
alia, drafting the final recommendation of the team to the JISC, ensuring that any diverging views within the team are 
reflected. The review team, under the guidance of the JISC members, including alternate members, responsible for 
supervising the review, will provide input, prepare requests for clarification and/or further information to the AIE and/or 
project participants, and analyse information received during the review. 
111 Paragraph 37 of the JI Review Procedures. 
112 Paragraph 38 of the JI Review Procedures. Sander Simonetti 
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and information may be requested from the project participants and the AIE.
113 The two JISC members 
supervising the review are responsible for preparing the final recommendation to be forwarded to the 
JISC within two weeks after the decision by the JISC to perform the review.
114 
The JISC must complete its review within 30 days following its decision to perform the review.
115 
Taking into consideration recommendations by the two JISC members responsible for the review, the 
JISC may decide to (a) accept the determination without conditions, (b) accept the determination 
subject to certain conditions, or (c) reject the determination.
116 The JISC must inform the project 
participants and the AIE of the outcome of the review, and publish its decision and reasoning.
117  
If the review indicates any issues relating to the performance of the AIE, the JISC may consider 
whether to trigger a spot check of the AIE, in accordance with the procedures for accrediting 
independent entities.
118 If the JISC decides to reject the determination and if the AIE is found to be in a 
situation of malfeasance or incompetence, the AIE will reimburse the costs of the review.
119 
Unlike the PDD review, it is not explicitly mentioned that the JISC review of the determination is 
final. However, the JI Guidelines do not provide for further remedies or appeal procedures, nor do 
other JI decisions or regulations. 
3.3 Issuance and Transfer of ERUs 
As in Track 1, the issuance and transfer of ERUs is carried out by the host country. When the AIE's 
determination of the greenhouse gas emission reductions or removals generated by the JI project has 
become final in accordance with the JI Guidelines, the host country will issue the ERUs 
accordingly
120, in accordance with the relevant host country's national JI rules.  
                                                      
113 Paragraph 39-41 of the JI Review Procedures. 
114 Paragraph 43 of the JI Review Procedures. 
115 Paragraph 39 of the JI Guidelines and paragraph 44 of the JISC Review Procedures. 
116 Paragraph 47 of the JI Review Procedures. 
117 Paragraph 48 of the JI Review Procedures. 
118 Paragraph 49 of the JI Review Procedures. 
119 Paragraph 50 of the JI Review Procedures (which also states that this provision is "subject to review as experience 
accrues"). 
120 By converting a number of its AAUs into ERUs. Access to Justice for the Private Sector in Joint Implementation Projects under the Kyoto Protocol 
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Figure III: Track 2 Project Cycle 
 
4. Disputes and Remedies 
A variety of disputes can arise under JI, at any stage of the JI Track 1 and Track 2 procedures and 
project cycles. Such disputes may include private parties playing their role in JI as project participants 
or verifiers (AIEs). The remainder of this paper explores what remedies are available to such private 
parties.  
4.1 Access to Justice 
When it comes to the determination of their rights and obligations, private parties are entitled to proper 
access to justice. The right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial 
tribunal is a basic human right recognised in several human rights treaties, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
121 
Therefore, when disputes arise and private parties feel that their rights are impaired, either by another 
private party or by an act or unfavorable decision of a public entity or authority, they should be able to 
have their case judged by a court or tribunal.
122 This could entail, inter alia, requesting injunctive 
relief against the impairing party or lodging an appeal against the impairing decision of the relevant 
                                                      
121  See Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted on 10 December 1948; available at 
www.un.org/en/documents/udhr); Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted on 16 
December 1966; available at www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm); Article 6 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted on 4 November 1950; available at 
www.hrcr.org/docs/Eur_Convention/euroconv.html); Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (adopted on 7 December 2000; available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf). 
122 See, inter alia, L. Lehtimaja and M. Pellonpää, "Article 10 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights", in: The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ed. G. Alfredsson and A. Eide, The Hague 1999, p. 227; and Jacobs and White, 
The European Convention on Human Rights, New York 2006, p. 170 ff. Sander Simonetti 
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authority and requesting review and redress thereof.
123 If a public (non-governmental) institution has 
the authority to take decisions which directly affect the rights and obligations of private parties, its 
decisions should be challengeable, either before the courts or an independent tribunal recognized by 
the institution to hear the claims of such private entities, or via a judicial review mechanism 
established by the institution itself.
124 The court or tribunal which is to assess the case must not only be 
independent and impartial, but also exercise due process and ensure that its proceedings are fair, 
equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive. In addition, the court or tribunal should have the 
ability to create a binding obligation on the defendant to protect the claimant's rights, i.e. its judgment 
should be enforceable against the defendant. 
So when a private party engaging in JI becomes involved in a dispute, it should have access to 
adequate and effective judicial remedies. The relevant legal framework should ideally not only provide 
a means to resolve the dispute of the individual private party concerned, but also contribute to increase 
the integrity of the entire JI process. If judgments serve as precedents, the dispute settlement 
mechanism can advance uniformity in the application of the JI rules and a degree of consistency 
necessary to ensure equity among the private parties involved in JI.
125 In the case of proceedings 
against an institution that has taken a decision which impairs the rights of a private party, these should 
include a review of the reasoning of the relevant institution and an independent check on the validity 
of its decision. The resulting judgment should then not only annul, amend or rectify the impairing 
decision, but also be an incentive to the relevant institution and similar decision-making bodies to stay 
within the boundaries of the applicable rules and conform their future decisions to the judgment. This 
will improve the functioning of the relevant institution and contribute to its legitimacy. Judgments 
should therefore be issued in writing and made publicly accessible. To avoid fragmentation and 
conflicting interpretations of applicable rules, there is a clear advantage in having a single competent 
body to review cases (or several lower bodies of first instance and one supreme body to hear final 
appeals).
126 Such body can then acquire expertise and build a uniform and consistent set of review 
standards to ensure unity of review and interpretation of the applicable rules. 
If these conditions are met, access to justice will lead to better decision-making by the relevant 
Kyoto institutions, increase trust in the system and thereby stimulate private party participation. 
Private parties expect fair, predictable and non-arbitrary treatment from the competent authorities.
127 
They are more likely to make long-term investment decisions in a stable and predictable regulatory 
climate, with a solid system of rules and effective remedies in case their interests are harmed. The next 
section explores the remedies available to private parties in various types of JI-related disputes. 
4.2 Types of Disputes 
JI-related disputes may arise between private parties and (a) states, (b) other private parties, or (c) UN 
bodies, particularly the JISC in Track 2. Below, each of these types of disputes is assessed from an 
access to justice perspective. 
                                                      
123 For environmental matters, the right to access to justice has been confirmed in the Aarhus Convention (Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, signed 
on 25 June 1998, available at www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf). This convention requires its member states 
to ensure that the public has a right to access to environmental information and a right to participate in environmental 
decision-making and be granted proper access to justice in case in case these rights are violated. This could, inter alia, be 
relevant for members of the public in the host country of a JI project that are concerned about the environmental impact 
of the project. See Aarhus meets Kyoto, ed. F. Rizzo, A. Buchman et al., Szenrendre 2003. 
124 Meijer, n. 15 above, p. 917. 
125 Cf. Kalas and Herwig, n. 15 above, p. 119-120. 
126 Ibid., p. 130. 
127 J.D. Werksman, "Defending the 'Legitimate Expectations' of Private Investors under the Climate Change Regime: In 
Search of a Legal Theary for Redress", Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2008 (39), p. 691. Access to Justice for the Private Sector in Joint Implementation Projects under the Kyoto Protocol 
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(a) Disputes with States 
Several possible disputes between private parties and states can arise, both with respect to letters of 
approval (LoAs) and the issuance and transfer or ERUs. 
The first type of dispute concerns the authorisation of the private party by an Annex I country to 
participate, under its responsibility, in JI projects (this can be the host country of the JI project or 
another Annex I country involved). Private parties wishing to engage in JI have to apply for an LoA 
under applicable national JI rules of the relevant Annex I country. Disputes may concern any decision 
of the relevant national authorities that is deemed unfavourable by the respective private party, e.g., a 
decision to refuse authorisation, to grant authorisation only under certain conditions, or to revoke a 
previously issued LoA.
128 In practice, private entities sometimes try to have the relevant Annex I 
country include an arbitration clause in its LoA, in order to secure a forum in case LoA-related 
disputes arise. In our experience, however, Annex I countries refuse to agree to arbitration, arguing 
that rendering the LoA is an act under national administrative law which cannot be made subject to 
arbitration. 
The second type of dispute consists of disagreement between private project participants and the 
host country of the JI project about the issuance and transfer of ERUs. In both Track 1 and Track 2, it 
is the host country that will eventually issue the ERUs and transfer these to the relevant project 
participant(s) under its national JI rules. The question arises as to what project participants can do if 
they disagree with the host country's decisions in this respect, e.g., if the host country refuses to issue 
ERUs, or issues fewer ERUs than expected. If the project participant is a country itself (i.e. a Party to 
the Kyoto Protocol) there is a dispute settlement procedure under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol.
129 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol are committed to seeking settlement of a dispute through 
negotiations or any other peaceful means of their own choice. If after 12 months following notification 
by one Party to another that a dispute exists between them, the Parties concerned have not been able to 
settle their dispute, the dispute will be submitted, at the request of any of the Parties to the dispute, to 
conciliation.
130 Parties also have two options for binding settlement of their disputes, namely 
submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and/or arbitration.
131 The 
UNFCCC refers to annexes on arbitration and conciliation to be adopted by the COP "as soon as 
practicable".
132 However, to date these annexes have never been agreed. 
In any event, as the dispute settlement provisions from the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol concern 
state-state disputes only, this does not help the private project participant that disagrees with the host 
country of the JI project or with the other Annex I country involved. However, such participant should 
be able to challenge the decisions of the relevant Annex I country under that country's domestic 
administrative law.
133 Therefore, JI-related disputes between private parties and states would in 
principle not give raise to concerns about access to justice.
134 As these disputes will not regard the 
                                                      
128 Revocation of authorisation may also take place upon instigation of UN bodies or Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. A private 
entity can only participate in JI project activities if it has the authorisation of a state and its participation will be under the 
responsibility of that state. This means that if the JISC believes that a private entity has acted in violation of its 
obligations under the JI Guidelines or other regulations, the JISC can hold the authorising state responsible for this 
violation and, in turn, this state could withdraw its authorisation with the result that the entity involved can no longer 
participate in the JI project. 
129 Article 14 of the UNFCCC, which is referred to in Article 19 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
130 Article 14(5) of the UNFCCC. 
131 Kalas and Herwig, n. 15 above, p. 64. 
132 Article 14(2b) and 14 (7) of the UNFCCC. 
133 D. Stott and A. Felix, Principles of Administative Law, London 1997, p. 4 ff. 
134 In addition, there may be certain remedies under bilateral or multilateral investment treaties (BITs or MITs respectively). 
If a BIT or an MIT is in force between the host state of the JI project and the home state of the participating private party, Sander Simonetti 
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Kyoto rules as such (JI Guidelines, CMP Decisions etc), but rather the applicable national JI rules of 
the relevant Annex I country (on the issuance of LoAs or ERUs), the available procedures under 
domestic administrative law should also be sufficient to ensure a uniform interpretation of these rules. 
(b) Disputes with Other Private Parties 
Disputes may also arise between private parties themselves. These could be between JI project 
participants, if several private project participants are involved in the JI project. Such disputes would 
probably not raise concerns about access to justice either, as there will be contracts in place between 
these private parties, such as project agreements, joint venture agreements or Emission Reductions 
Purchase Agreements (ERPAs)
135, which usually contain arbitration clauses, providing parties with a 
forum in case disputes arise.
136 The arbitration clause of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 
The Hague is often used in carbon contracts. The PCA has developed Rules for Arbitration of 
Disputes relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment, the use of which is recommended by 
the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) in its model agreements.
137 
In JI projects under Track 2, another type of dispute between private JI parties can arise when a 
private project participant disagrees with the work of the AIE that was appointed to make the 
necessary determinations. If the determination is already published, the only way to change it is by 
way of a JISC review. Under the JI Guidelines, however, private parties cannot request a review of the 
AIE's determination, as this is reserved for countries (Parties to the Kyoto Protocol) and members of 
the JISC. Therefore, if a private party wishes to have the determination reviewed, it can only try to 
lobby Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and/or JISC members to persuade them to request a review (see 
section (c) below). If the determination is not yet published, disputes may arise between private 
project participants and AIEs regarding, e.g., the method of working of the AIE, its timing, fees or 
other contractual issues. For such disputes, the contract between the project participant and the AIE 
will typically contain a jurisdiction or arbitration clause (or refer to applicable general terms and 
conditions of the AIE that contain such jurisdiction or arbitration clause). The dispute can then be 
submitted to the relevant court or arbitral tribunal. It should be noted that the AIE contract or general 
terms and conditions may also contain certain exclusions or limitations of liability for the AIE which 
restrict the project participant's possibilities for recourse. 
As disputes between private parties will usually not concern the Kyoto rules, but rather contractual 
matters such as the interpretation and performance of bilateral ERPAs or service agreements, dispute 
resolution through arbitration or national courts will not pose major problems with respect to 
fragmentation or conflicting interpretations of JI rules. 
(Contd.)                                                                   
this may protect the private party’s rights. Such treaties often contain arbitration clauses that grant private parties a right 
to arbitrate claims against the host country if they have made an "investment" in the host country and the host country has 
breached the relevant investment standard. However, it depends on the wording of the relevant BIT or MIT whether 
private party participation in a Kyoto JI project qualifies as an "investment" under such treaty. See Ratliff, n. 16 above, p. 
388;  cf. also A. Boute, "The Potential Contribution of International Investment Protection Law to Combat Climate 
Change", Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 2009, 27(3), p. 365 ff. 
135 ERPAs are concluded in both JI and CDM projects between the carbon purchaser and the private or public entities 
transferring the carbon credits resulting from the relevant emissions reduction project (ERUs or CERs, respectively) at an 
agreed price, thereby forward selling the carbon credits. In practice, both the transferring party and the purchaser under 
the ERPA are often appointed as project participants in the relevant JI or CDM project. 
136 Ratliff, n. 16 above, p. 395. 
137 The rules can be downloaded from the PCA website (see www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1058). Access to Justice for the Private Sector in Joint Implementation Projects under the Kyoto Protocol 
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(c) Disputes with the JISC 
From an access to justice perspective, the most troublesome (and interesting) disputes are those 
between private parties and the JISC in JI Track 2. Such disputes could arise in respect to JISC 
decisions on the accreditation of independent entities or project determinations. The relief sought by 
private parties involved would then consist of an independent judicial review of the contested 
decisions. 
However, if the JISC refuses to accredit an applicant independent entity, or suspends or 
disaccredits an AIE, such entity does not have any remedies against the JISC under the JI Guidelines. 
Nor are there any remedies for private project participants that disagree with project determinations. 
Such private project participants have no other means of redress than the diplomatic route of trying to 
lobby Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and/or members of the JISC in order to persuade them to request a 
review. If the JISC decides not to conduct a review, the project participants cannot challenge that 
decision under the JI Guidelines.  
If a review is carried out, project participants may disagree with the outcome. Following a review, 
the JISC may decide, for example, that the determination should be revised (leading to no ERUs or 
fewer ERUs for a project activity than the project participants believe should be issued) or that the 
determination is rejected altogether. The JISC decision in this respect is final, and the project 
participant has no remedy against such decision under the JI Guidelines. 
There is currently no mechanism available under the JI procedures for private parties engaging in JI 
Track 2 to challenge decisions of the JISC. As this type of dispute concerns the interpretation and 
application of the Kyoto rules, the UNFCCC legal framework seems to be missing an essential 
component. Whereas it explicitly creates an opportunity for private parties to engage in international 
emission reduction projects, it does not provide those private parties with adequate legal protection in 
case their interests are prejudiced.
138 It can never be ruled out that at some point private parties may 
disagree with the JISC on the interpretation of the JI rules, potential conflicts of interest or other 
matters. The Kyoto system currently leaves such private parties effectively at the mercy of the JISC 
and offers them no possibilities to appeal against unfavourable JISC decisions. The next section 
examines whether such private parties may find any remedies outside the Kyoto procedures. 
4.3 Private Party Remedies against the JISC 
Private parties that wish to challenge decisions of the JISC, or otherwise bring claims against the JISC, 
may not find a forum willing to adjudicate their matter, as most national courts apply a relatively 
broad form of jurisdictional immunity for international organisations.
139 This is similar to sovereign 
states, which enjoy immunity from suit in the courts of a foreign state, at least for acts which may be 
qualified as governmental (acta jure imperii), rather than commercial (acta jure gestionis).
140 The 
main argument for such immunity for international organisations is that being subject to the judgment 
of a national court might jeopardise the independence of the international organisation and disrupt its 
smooth functioning.
141 However, the validity of such argument is questionable, especially if the 
                                                      
138 In the context of CDM, Werksman (n. 127 above, p. 686-687) doubts whether private parties have any enforceable rights 
at all under the Kyoto framework, arguing that significant safeguards have already designed into the system and private 
parties may not be entitled to additional remedies. He admits that none of these safeguards gives private parties direct 
recourse to the Kyoto institutions, but suggests that such parties can advance their interests through their representatives 
on the CMP. However, this seems hardly adequate legal protection in a system that explicitly invites private parties to 
invest or otherwise play a role in emission reduction projects. 
139 Meijer, n. 15 above, p. 876; A. Reinisch, International Organisations before National Courts 36, 169 (2000). 
140 J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge 2002, p. 147. 
141 See Cases and materials on the international legal system, ed. C.T. Oliver, New York 1995, p. 613; Meijer, n. 15 above, 
p. 900. Sander Simonetti 
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relevant international organisation has not provided for a proper review procedure itself.
142 If private 
parties are thus denied their basic right to appeal against decisions that affect their rights, it could be 
contended that the relevant international organisation should not be entitled to immunity, even if this 
would affect their smooth functioning.
143 
Various arguments have therefore been made against jurisdictional immunity for international 
organisations,  inter alia on the basis of the substitution theory. It is argued that an international 
organisation that infringes a private party's rights should not enjoy immunity from suit in respect of 
such infringements, because the organisation was founded by member states that are bound by human 
rights principles and conventions, and states cannot transfer more rights than they have themselves.
144 
Therefore, if sovereign states are required to allow private parties the possibility to appeal decisions 
that affect their rights, the decisions of international organisations founded by such states should not 
be immune to appeal. And if these international organisations have not established or recognised an 
appeal procedure for private parties themselves, national courts should hear such appeals. There is also 
the theory of human rights as “higher ranking law”. As human rights, including the right of access to 
justice, are universal and fundamental rights, who would argue that international organisations are not 
bound to such elementary norms? In the case of a UN body this may be even more compelling, as it 
was the UN that promulgated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
145 However, these theories 
do not alter the fact that in practice international organisations are generally granted very broad 
jurisdictional immunity.  
Functional Necessity 
Most courts apply the approach of functional necessity: an international organisation is entitled to such 
immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions in the fulfilment of its purposes.
146 As a 
consequence, the decisions of an international organisation that are pursuant to its goals and directly 
linked to its core business fall within the realm of such organisation’s jurisdictional immunities.
147 In 
respect of CDM, Meijer points out that decisions by CDM institutions (in particular the CDM 
Executive Board) which directly affect the rights of private entities are part of the CDM institution's 
"core business" and, pursuant to the functional necessity doctrine, disputes concerning such decisions 
could therefore not be brought before national courts.
148 The same would apply to decisions of the 
JISC affecting the rights of private parties engaging in JI. Deciding on the accreditation of independent 
entities, project determinations and reviews are the very reasons for the JISC's existence and it would 
therefore enjoy immunity from suit in respect of such decisions under the functional necessity 
doctrine. 
                                                      
142 Meijer, n. 15 above, p. 917. 
143 Cf. M. Singer, "Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organisations: Human Rights and Functional Necessity 
Concerns", Virginia Journal of International Law, 1995 (36), p. 92. 
144 C. Flinterman and W. van Genugten, Niet-statelijke actoren en de rechten van de mens; gevestigde waarden, nieuwe 
wegen, The Hague 2003, p. 140-141. 
145 Arsanjani therefore argues that “It is hardly radical to contend that the UN, through which the Declaration came about, 
must, in its own activities and procedures, comply with these principles to the greatest possible extents”; see M.H. 
Arsanjani, "Claims Against International Organisations: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?", The Yale Journal of World 
Public Order, 1980, 7(2), p. 175. 
146 Klabbers, n. 140 above, p. 148. 
147 P.H.F. Bekker, The Legal Position of Intergovernmental Organisations - A Functional Necessity Analysis of Their Legal 
Status and Immunities, The Hague 1994, p. 109-110. 
148 Meijer, n. 15 above, p. 905. Access to Justice for the Private Sector in Joint Implementation Projects under the Kyoto Protocol 
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Jurisdiction of National Courts? 
Meijer, however, proposes a more nuanced approach to the jurisdictional immunity of international 
organisations in the context of CDM and argues that immunity should only apply to CDM institutions 
where the general lawmaking and policymaking powers of these institutions are concerned, and not to 
decisions of these institutions aimed directly at private entities (referred to by Meijer as administrative 
decisions).
149 This would require a closer look at the core business decisions of the CDM institutions. 
If such a closer look reveals that the decision in question is a general rule or law of the international 
organisation, immunity should apply and private entities should not be able to challenge this general 
rule before a national court. If, however, the decision is an administrative decision aimed at a 
particular private entity and the CDM institution does not provide for a satisfactory internal review 
procedure, immunity should not apply and review by a national court should be allowed.
150 
Meijer's arguments for access to national courts in respect of administrative decisions of CDM 
institutions could also apply to administrative decisions of the JISC. However, not all of these 
arguments are convincing. As an important reason for allowing private parties to appeal against the 
decisions of an international institution before a national court, Meijer mentions that human rights 
considerations call for such review.
151 However, this observation seems to call for a form of 
independent review, rather than for such review to necessarily be carried out by national courts. It is 
beyond questioning that access to justice is a basic human right. But the best way to provide such 
access for private parties active in CDM or JI is probably not through the national courts, since there 
will be serious disadvantages in bringing Kyoto institutions before national courts.  
An important downside would be fragmentation, i.e. different courts rendering different decisions 
in similar cases and different interpretations of applicable Kyoto rules. According to Meijer
152, such 
differences will not be the result of different courts ruling on the same issue, but of different "fact 
patterns" in the cases on which the courts are asked to rule. It seems obvious, however, that different 
national courts from different jurisdictions may interpret the CDM and JI rules differently and that 
their judgments on similar legal questions may be inconsistent with one another. Indeed, it is not 
uncommon even for different national courts within one jurisdiction to hold different views on similar 
legal questions (therefore, many jurisdictions have a supreme court to ensure a uniform interpretation). 
Fragmentation will also create an opportunity for forum shopping: parties will pick and choose the 
court most likely to rule in their favor. Meijer
153 does not believe that private parties active in Kyoto 
projects will engage in extensive forum shopping. However, in practice we already see "LoA 
shopping" in Kyoto projects, as private parties carefully consider in which country they wish to apply 
for an LoA, looking for the most favorable jurisdiction with respect to issuing LoAs and receiving 
ERUs. Another disadvantage of allowing national courts to review JISC decisions would be the 
accessibility of the judgments and their ability to serve as precedents for future decisions. According 
to Meijer, national judges frequently look at how foreign judges have interpreted certain provisions, 
                                                      
149 Ibid., p. 908. 
150 Meijer (ibid., p. 914-915) points to an analogy with the EU, where private entities cannot challenge general EU rules 
(provisions of the constituent treaties, directives, or regulations) before the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) 
or the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (CFI). However, paragraph 4 of Article 230 of the European 
Community (EC) Treaty provides that a natural or legal person that is the addressee of a decision of an EU institution (as 
opposed to the target of a general rule) can challenge this decision before the ECJ or the CFI. It also provides for such a 
challenge by a natural or legal person in two other situations: (i) when this natural or legal person is not the addressee but 
is directly and individually concerned with the decision, or (ii) when the decision is labeled as a “regulation” but is de 
facto a decision of direct and individual concern to the natural or legal person. In other words, decisions of EU 
institutions that are of direct and individual concern to a private or legal person, whether addressed to this person or not, 
and whether officially labeled “decision” or not, can be challenged. 
151 Ibid., p. 910. 
152 Ibid., p. 913. 
153 Ibid., p. 914. Sander Simonetti 
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but it is clear that case law on related JI-issues from different national courts will be much less easily 
retrievable and accessible than judgments of a single body. Most importantly, however, Meijer's 
solution would not be an effective remedy for private parties, because, as she admits, there is little to 
no possibility of enforcing the judgment of a national court against an international institution.
154  
Moreover, Meijer's plea for access to national courts will most probably not be heard by national 
courts, which continue to grant a broad immunity to international organisations, possibly even more so 
in the case of UNFCCC bodies such as the CDM Executive Board and the JISC, as UN organs enjoy 
an immunity which is even stronger than most other international organisations.
155 
Absolute Immunity for UN Organs 
As a result of its particular history and special role, the UN organisation is granted absolute 
jurisdictional immunity in national courts.
156 Although the UN Charter creates immunities “as are 
necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes”
157, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations states that the UN “shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except 
insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity”
158. The Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies provides the same absolute immunity.
159 
Therefore, unless UN organs have explicitly or implicitly, wholly or partially waived their immunities 
in their constituent documents, they enjoy absolute immunity. The Kyoto institutions of the UNFCCC, 
including the JISC and the CDM Executive Board, have not waived their immunity. 
4.4 Alternative Remedies 
If it turns out that private parties cannot challenge JISC decisions and enforce their rights vis-à-vis the 
JISC, they may wish to explore other remedies and try to instigate proceedings against (a) individual 
members of the JISC, or (b) the relevant member states (Parties to the Kyoto Protocol). 
Liability of Individual JISC Members 
Private parties that disagree with decisions of the JISC may wish to sue individual members of the 
JISC on the basis of legal concepts such as wrongful acts or tort (e.g., with respect to their conduct on 
a review team or accreditation panel).
160 Under the UNFCCC Headquarters Agreement
161, all persons 
invited to participate in the official business of the UNFCCC and serving on constituted bodies under 
                                                      
154 Ibid., p. 923. Meijer also argues (p. 898) that a practical advantage of bringing Kyoto disputes before national courts is 
that potentially numerous conflicts can be handled by not just one but several courts, which may make resolution of these 
conflicts faster. However, this does not seem practical at all, as the Kyoto institutions would then have to defend 
themselves all over the world, and hire and instruct law firms in numerous jurisdictions, which will cost them 
considerable time and resources and would therefore probably negatively affect their functioning. 
155 Although it may be questioned whether Kyoto institutions such as the JISC and the CDM Executive Board qualify as 
official UN organs in this respect, cf. the memorandum referred to in n. 163 below.  
156 Singer, n. 143 above, p. 84-88. 
157 Charter of the United Nations (signed on 26 June 1945; available at www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml), 
Article 105. 
158 Signed on 13 February 1946 (available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/cpiun-cpisa/cpiun-cpisa.html), Article 2. 
159 Convention of 21 November 1947 (available at www.uia.org/legal/app51.php), Article III, paragraphs 4 and 33. 
160 This section will focus on jurisdictional issues and not discuss the question of the law applicable to such claims. 
161 Agreement among the United Nations, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Secretariat of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change concerning the Headquarters of the Convention Secretariat 
dated 20 June 1996 (available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/120001_144071/24/3/00019759.pdf), and its amending 
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the Kyoto Protocol enjoy immunity from legal process in respect of all acts performed by them in their 
official capacity.
162 However, as this is only an agreement between the UN, the German government 
and the UNFCCC Secretariat, members may still be held liable for their acts outside Germany, unless 
there is another basis for immunity. 
Such basis may be found in the 1946 Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United 
Nations. However, in a memorandum to the UNFCCC
163, the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN 
advised that it would not be appropriate for individuals serving on constituted bodies and expert 
review teams under the Kyoto Protocol to be considered “experts on missions for the United Nations” 
pursuant to the 1946 Convention
164, as such individuals are not appointed by the Secretary-General, 
nor do they perform missions for the United Nations. The CMP therefore requested and authorised the 
UNFCCC Secretariat to take a number of actions aimed at minimising the risk of legal action against 
individuals serving on constituted bodies established under the Kyoto Protocol.
165 As a result, the 
Secretariat has taken, inter alia, the following actions
166 to minimise the risks of disputes, complaints 
and claims against individuals serving on constituted bodies under the Kyoto Protocol: (a) convene 
meetings of constituted bodies at the seat of the UNFCCC Secretariat in Germany, where individuals 
serving on these bodies have privileges and immunities for acts performed by them in their official 
capacity in accordance with the provisions of the Headquarters Agreement, and (b) where meetings of 
constituted bodies are convened at venues other than the seat of the UNFCCC Secretariat, ensure that 
the host country agreements or memorandums of understanding for the meeting contained provisions 
for privileges and immunities for individuals serving on these bodies. 
In view of the above, there may indeed be certain possibilities for private parties to hold individual 
members of the JISC personally liable before national courts (outside Germany).
167 If such claim is 
granted, this may lead to an obligation for the relevant JISC member to pay damages, but will in 
principle not alter the relevant decisions of the JISC. It is therefore not a very satisfactory way to fill 
the fundamental legal "gap" in the Kyoto framework, as private parties would not necessarily wish to 
challenge the personal conduct of the individuals serving on the JISC, but rather the decisions and 
actions of the JISC itself (as a Kyoto institution) and its interpretation and application of the Kyoto 
rules. This remedy would thus not be much of a contribution to the legitimacy of the JI process and 
probably not lead to better decision-making. Moreover, it could prove to be ineffective, as the 
individual JISC members may not provide sufficient recourse for the monetary claims of private 
parties.
168 
                                                      
162 See also Article 14 of the Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Nations concerning the 
Headquarters of the United Nations Volunteers Programme of 10 November 1995 (available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/120001_144071/7/1/00005112.pdf), which pursuant to Article 2 of the UNFCCC Headquarters 
Agreement applies, mutatis mutandis, to the UNFCCC Secretariat. 
163 Memorandum dated 30 June 2006 from the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations, transmitting the response on 
privileges and immunities for individuals serving on constituted bodies established under the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC (see FCCC/SBI/2006/20). 
164 Article VI. 
165 Decision 9/CMP.2. 
166 See FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/10. 
167 Werksman, n. 127 above, p. 681-682. 
168 However, the possibility that they may be held personally liable may be an incentive to the members of the JISC to 
cooperate to establishing or recognizing an independent appeal body. Sander Simonetti 
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Member State Liability 
Private parties may also try to instigate legal proceedings against the member states of the UNFCCC, 
either before their own national courts or another competent forum.
169 The reasoning is as follows: the 
state is obliged to give (absolute) immunity to the UN bodies of the Kyoto Protocol on the ground of 
the state being a Party to the Kyoto Protocol. The state, however, is also a party to treaties such as the 
European Convention on Civil Rights or the UN Declaration on Human Rights, which impose an 
obligation on the state to provide for access to justice and hearing by a tribunal in the determination of 
the rights and obligations of individuals. In providing (absolute) immunity to the Kyoto bodies, the 
member state may therefore impair the rights of such individuals. In other words: individuals may hold 
states liable if the international organisation created by these states impairs the rights of private parties 
and the states have not ensured access to justice within the procedures of the relevant international 
organisation.
170 
This reasoning is to some extent the reverse of the aforementioned substitution theory. States that 
are a party to human rights treaties should ensure that these are not violated by international 
organisations that they have voluntarily created and to which they have voluntarily transferred certain 
powers. Such argument may be even more compelling in respect of Annex I countries involved in JI 
and CDM that have issued an LoA, as such states have not only agreed to the creation of the Kyoto 
institutions and mechanisms, but also explicitly authorised the relevant private parties to participate in 
these mechanisms.  
However, practical problems may arise when trying to hold states liable in this respect, as member 
states would then be held to account for actions of an international organisation on which they do not 
have much influence (and with which they may not agree themselves). In addition, the international 
organisation in question will not be a party to the legal proceedings. This remedy would therefore not 
contribute to a uniform interpretation and application of the Kyoto rules and not constitute a proper 
alternative to direct private party appeals against JISC decisions. 
5. Conclusion  
The current Kyoto framework does not safeguard the legal position of private parties that participate in 
international emission reduction projects. Private parties engaging in JI Track 2 projects are dependent 
on the JISC, but the system offers them no remedies against unfavorable JISC decisions. The same 
applies to private parties that participate in CDM projects and are faced with decisions of the CDM 
Executive Board.
171 This is inconsistent with the fundamental right of access to justice. 
It would therefore be desirable that a robust dispute resolution mechanism be included in the 
relevant UNFCCC procedures. The best solution seems to be the establishment of a new independent 
appeal body for all flexible mechanisms to hear private party complaints, carry out judicial review of 
                                                      
169 The question of jurisdiction will not be further discussed here, but there may of course be immunity concerns when trying 
to hold states liable; see C.W. Jenks, International Immunities, London 1961, p. 38. 
170 Flinterman and Van Genugten, n. 144 above, p. 143. In the European context, if a member state grants absolute immunity 
to an international organisation and no access to justice for private parties that will be subject to that organisation's 
decisions, it may be argued that the state is liable for breach of 6 European Convention on Human Rights (the fair trial 
provision, which also encompasses access to justice). This could lead to payment of damages by the member state. In the 
Osman vs UK case (ECHR 28 October 1998, NJ 2000, 134), the European Court of Human Rights ruled that a “blanket 
immunity” may create an unacceptable limitation of one’s right to a fair trial. In Waite and Kennedy vs Germany (ECHR 
18 February 1999, NJB 1999, p. 510.) this standpoint was refined in cases dealing with international organisations. The 
Court accepted such immunity, provided that the organisation itself has created an internal procedure that provides an 
adequate possibility of protecting the involved party’s rights under the European Convention of Human Rights. 
171 See also the memo of the UNFCCC Secretariat to the CMP of 29 September 2008 (FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/10, paragraph 
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the decision of the relevant Kyoto institution
172 and, if necessary, annul such decision or issue binding 
instructions. Its judgments should be duly reasoned and made publicly accessible. Such independent 
review mechanism would contribute to a uniform interpretation of the applicable Kyoto rules and 
increase trust in the system. It should ideally be an integral part of the post-Kyoto legal framework for 
carbon trading that the member states of the UN are currently negotiating, further to the somewhat 
disappointing outcome of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (COP 15).
173 However, 
experience has taught that this may be troublesome, as the same member states have not even been 
able to agree on the (arguably less controversial) annexes on arbitration and conciliation to the 
UNFCCC.
174  
In anticipation (or in the absence) of such overarching appeal mechanism at the UN level, the JISC 
and the CDM Executive Board should adopt a dispute resolution mechanism themselves, allowing 
private parties to challenge their decisions before a competent, independent and impartial tribunal.
175 
A first step may have been taken at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, when the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol requested the CDM Executive Board to design procedures for considering appeals 
that are brought by stakeholders directly involved.
176 It remains to be seen, however, what appeal 
procedures the CDM Executive Board will implement and whether these will constitute proper access 
for private sector stakeholders to an independent tribunal, rather than just another review by the CDM 
Executive Board itself. In any case, such appeal procedures will be limited to CDM and probably have 
a confined scope.
177 Therefore, an integral appeal body for all flexible mechanisms would still be 
preferable. 
The possibility to challenge decisions of the Kyoto institutions would increase the legal protection 
of private parties playing their important role in the flexible mechanisms and advance the stable 
investment environment necessary for long-term private sector involvement in combating climate 
change. 
                                                      
172 This can be the JISC, the CDM Executive Board or the UNFCCC Secretariat (which plays a role in JI, CDM and 
International Emissions Trading). 
173 Para. 7 of the Copenhagen Accord (the document drawn up by a limited group of countries, which the delegates agreed to 
"take note of" at the final plenary session of the conference on 18 December 2009) provides that opportunities to use 
markets will be pursued (to enhance the cost-effectiveness of and to promote mitigation actions) and that developing 
countries should be provided incentives to continue to develop on a low emission pathway. See the UNFCCC website at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv.pdf. 
174 F. Yamin, "Operational and Institutional Challenges", in: Issues and Options - The Clean Development Mechanism, ed. J. 
Goldemberg, New York 1998 (United Nations Development Program), p. 79. 
175 The JISC and the CDM Executive Board may, e.g., do this by expressing their willingness to refer disputes to an arbitral 
tribunal and conclude arbitration agreements with private parties whenever disputes arise. 
176 Para. 42 and 43 of the CMP.5 Decision "Further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism" (available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cmp5_cdm_auv.pdf). 
177 Para. 42 of the relevant CMP.5 Decision provides for procedures "considering appeals that are brought by stakeholders 
directly involved, defined in a conservative manner, in the design, approval or implementation of clean development 
mechanism project activities or proposed clean development mechanism project activities, in relation to: (a) situations 
where a designated operational entity may not have performed its duties in accordance with the rules or requirements of 
the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and/or the Executive Board; (b) 
rulings taken by or under the authority of the Executive Board regarding the rejection or alteration of requests for 
registration or issuance." Other types of disputes, such as disputes about the (dis)accreditation or suspension of DOEs 
would fall outside this scope. Sander Simonetti 
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List of Abbreviations 
AAU    Assigned Amount Unit 
AIE    Accredited Independent Entity 
CDM    Clean Development Mechanism 
CDM EB  CDM Executive Board 
CER    Certified Emission Reduction 
CFI    Court of First Instance of the European Communities 
CMP    COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
COP    Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC 
DFP    Designated Focal Point 
DNA    Designated National Authority 
DOE    Designated Operational Entity 
ECHR    European Court of Human Rights 
ECJ    Court of Justice of the European Communities 
ERPA    Emission Reductions Purchase Agreement 
ERU    Emission Reduction Unit 
EU   European  Union 
EU ETS  European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
ICJ    International Court of Justice 
IET   International  Emissions  Trading 
IETA    International Emissions Trading Association 
IPCC    Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
JI     Joint  Implementation 
JISC    Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee 
LoA    Letter of Approval 
PCA    Permanent Court of Arbitration 
PDD    Project Design Document 
RMU   Removal  Unit 
UN   United  Nations 
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